Yuku free message boards

39 more terrorist web sites:
cigars.bravepages.com/terrorsites.htm



Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Ansar Al-Islam (AL)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Arab Revolutionary Brigades
see Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Armed Islamic Group

'Asbat al-Ansar

Aum Shinrikyo
see Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)

Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Black September
see Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Communist Party of Philippines (CPP/NPA)

Dev Sol
see Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)
see Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Egyptian Islamic Jihad
see Al-Jihad

Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna
see Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Fatah Revolutionary Council
see Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya

HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

Helpers of Islam
see Ansar Al-Islam (AL)

Hizballah (Party of God)

The Islamic Group (IG)
see Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya

Islamic Jihad
see Al-Jihad

Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine
see Hizballah (Party of God)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)

Jaish Ansar Al-Islam
see Ansar Al-Islam (AL)

Al-Jihad

Jihad Group
see Al-Jihad

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Jund Al-Islam
see Ansar Al-Islam (AL)

Kach and Kahane Chai

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)

Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

Muslim Iranian Students Society
see The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

National Council of Resistance
see The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

National Liberation Army (ELN)--Colombia

The National Liberation Army of Iran
see The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

New People's Army (NPA)
see Communist Party of Philippines (CPP/NPA)

Organization of the Oppressed on Earth
see Hizballah (Party of God)

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Partisans of Islam
see Ansar Al-Islam (AL)

The People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI)
see The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Al-Qaida

Real IRA (RIRA)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

Revolutionary Justice Organization
see Hizballah (Party of God)

Revolutionary Nuclei

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)

Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
see Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Sangillan Force
see The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL)

Supporter of Islam
see Ansar Al-Islam (AL)

Talaa'al-Fateh
see Al-Jihad

True IRA
see Real IRA (RIRA)

United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC)

World Tamil Association (WTA)
see The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

World Tamil Movement (WTM)
see The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Groups Listed in Prior Editions of Patterns of Global Terrorism.

3rd October Organization
see Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)

15 May Organization

Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)

Algerian Terrorism

Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)
see Japanese Red Army

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)

Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)

Al-'Asifa
see Al-Fatah

Al-Fatah

Chukaku-Ha (Nucleus or Middle Core Faction)

Continuity Army Council
see Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

Ellalan Force
see The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT)
see The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)

Force 17

Former Armed Forces (ex-FAR)
see Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)

Interahamwe
see Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Jamaat ul-Fuqra

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

Khmer Rouge

Lautaro Popular Rebel Forces (FRPL)
see Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL)

Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL)

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)

Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM)

National Liberation Army (ELN) - Bolivia / Nestor Paz Zamora Commission (CNPZ)

Orange Volunteers (OV)

The Orly Group
see Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Party of Democratic Kampuchea
see Khmer Rouge

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC)

Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
see Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Provos
see Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Puka Inti (Sol Rojo, Red Sun)

Red Army Faction (RAF)

Red Brigades (BR)

Red Hand Defenders (RHD)

Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)

Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Sikh Terrorism

Sol Rojo
see Puka Inti (Sol Rojo, Red Sun)

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)

Al Ummah

United Popular Action Movement (MAPU/L)
see Lautaro Youth Movement (MJL)

Zviadists

Background on Terrorist Groups
library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/tgpndx.htm


(This Data was collected using OUR Intelligence Suite tools.)cigars.bravepages.com/ciserv.html


Our Home page
cigars.bravepages.com/institute.html

Using Border Gateway Protocol Vulnerabilities, a Hacker Could Cripple the Internet

DALLAS, July 26 /PRNewswire/ -- Recently, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (U.S. CERT) released information that multiple Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) implementations are vulnerable. Because BGP is the
most common routing protocol used by major external routers, these
vulnerabilities could lead to widespread denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that
might cripple the Internet and further reinforce the need for a layered
security approach to the most critical network device -- the router.
"While U.S. CERT just announced this vulnerability, the DeepNines security
platform has been able to protect networks against an attack like this for
more than two years now," says DeepNines President and COO Dan Jackson. "Our
platform architecture meets today's security requirements by allowing only
trusted peers to talk with the routers associated with a specific network.
And attackers can't use spoofed IP addresses to gain access because the
platform blocks those from ever entering the network."
According to U.S. CERT, the problem with the BGP implementations lies in
their handling of corrupt OPEN and UPDATE messages. Because the routing of
information across the Autonomous System (AS) networks that comprise the
Internet depends on BGP, fooling the protocol with bad OPEN and UPDATE
messages can enable an attacker to initiate a DoS attack.
The DeepNines security platform sits invisibly in front of the router and
addresses multiple levels of attacks but is uniquely suited to protect against
this type of attack. The platform monitors all TCP connections and keeps
spoofed IP addresses out of the network. It has built-in policies for BGP
that enable only verified peers to have access to the routers. Also, because
the security platform knows the AS number, it can recognize the approved BGP
message traffic that includes the AS number.

warfare is taking down the Net

Robert Vamosi
Senior Editor, Reviews
Monday, Aug. 2 If you're having trouble viewing your favorite sites on the Internet, you're not alone. Within the last two months, we've experienced the return of the MyDoom virus as well as attacks--not on popular Web sites themselves, but on the secondary sites that power them. These two facts are related. What started as local gangs tagging and shutting down rivals has matured into a more sophisticated game that's targeting the interdependencies of the Internet itself.

Tag, you're it
Years ago, young hackers aligned themselves into gangs that prided themselves in shutting down rival sites. They did so by writing quick-and-dirty viruses that compromised as many innocent computers as possible with remote backdoor Trojan horses--much like a street gang tagging a site. If the red gang put a Trojan on your computer, then your computer was owned by the red gang. The blue gang could come along and retag your computer, but that was unlikely.

The game, back then, was simple: If the red army was bigger, it could cause a denial-of-service attack on the blue army's server, shutting down the rival gang. Something like that happened in December 2001, when four Israeli youths were arrested for creating the Goner virus, which existed mainly to attack a rival gang. When you're talking a few hundred PCs, this "war" seems trivial.

Sobig changed things
But over time, these armies of red and blue grew more sophisticated. Needless to say, a person in control of a thousand compromised computers--a collection called a botnet --is in a very powerful position. With a single command, those thousand machines could launch a new virus, start a distributed denial-of-service attack on a single target, or relay spam messages.

A botnet's spam-sending abilities seem to be the holy grail of criminal activity. Starting with the Sobig virus in 2003, someone, somewhere realized these botnet networks of compromised computers could be sold to spammers, who would then use the machines to relay their spam across the Internet.

But the original Sobig infected relatively few systems, so criminal hackers (crackers ) went about improving it. Roughly every two to four weeks for several months, new versions of the Sobig virus continued to strike, then expire, each version reaching out to slightly more computers than the version before. By the time Sobig.f hit in August 2003, it infected more than a million PCs in a first few days. Given its success, other viruses soon followed this model; MyDoom and Netsky, in particular, were designed to create larger and larger networks of compromised computers.

Given that the Trojan horses used by these most recent viruses were created in Russia, there have been serious suggestions that the Russian mafia may be contracting with virus writers to create newer and better viruses solely to relay spam.

MyDoom's return
MyDoom goes even further. Its compromised computer networks sometimes have specific targets for denial-of-service attacks. The botnet created by MyDoom.a, for example, attacked Microsoft's Windows update site until Microsoft was forced to move it. MyDoom.b went after Microsoft and SCO Linux, successfully taking the SCO site offline for several days. At the time, many thought it was some kind of message about Linux or specifically about the lawsuits that SCO was filing against other users of Linux for copyright infringement. I suspect, even now, that the targets are arbitrary; I think that MyDoom and the others are test viruses released to find out what works and what doesn't.

The very latest version of MyDoom, MyDoom.m, adds a new trick: it uses popular search engines to harvest all the e-mail addresses within a given domain, then e-mails itself to those addresses. Although MyDoom.m briefly disabled major search engines, I think that its real purpose was to see if it would spread further, faster. It did, until Google and other search engines figured out how to filter the queries and return to work again. MyDoom.m peaked within a day, which is rare for an e-mail virus these days, and is thus not a very important virus.
geraldmsu@yahoo.com Islamic CEO
Higher goals
MyDoom.m and events such as the July 27, 2004, distributed denial-of-service attack that targeted DoubleClick and last month's Akamai attack make it clear, I think, that crackers are attempting to take down the Internet. Of course, they won't. The Internet links too many different types of computers and is far too robust to fail entirely.

Nonetheless, popular sites such as Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, and Apple can go dark, and I predict we'll see more attacks like this in the coming months.

Google was off line 8.2.04 for over a hour today

Gerald

LISTING OF TERRORIST AND BAD GUYS


23,933 names:

www.treas.gov/offices/enf...dnlist.txt


To subscribe go here $12 per year:
cigars.bravepages.com/ciserv.html

Aug.8,2001 Osama bin Ladin's Original Site
Note comment: "New website changes coming soon!..." supportersofshariah.org
(archive.org Aug.8,2001)
Not in operation Not in operation
was: Louisville, Kentucky SOS London, UK
Apr.10,2002 Supporters Of Shariah
www.supportersofshariah.com/ 202.95.140.21 Fasthosts Internet
Gloucester, UK Ali Hasan London, UK
Apr.10,2002 Jihad and the Mujahideen
Al-Qaeda www.azzam.com
(current entry portal, see my research on structure of Al-Qaeda web pages ) 216.40.201.216 Everyones Internet
Houston, Texas Azzam Publications London, UK
Apr.10,2002 MAIN server for Al-Qaeda
202.95.140.21/~acom/home.php 202.95.140.21 Pasifik Satelit
Nusantara
Indonesia Pasifik Satelit Nusantara Indonesia
Apr.10,2002 Taliban
www.taliban-news.com 216.40.250.8 Everyones Internet
Houston, Texas Halal Flowers Staten Island, NY, USA
Apr.10,2002 Chechen Mujahideen
www.kavkaz.org 66.28.38.232 Cogent Communications
Washington DC, USA Udug, Movladi Orlando, FL, USA
Apr.10,2002 Islamic Jihad (Palestine)
www.qudsway.com/ 66.113.195.20 Hostway Corporation
Chicago, IL, USA VeriSign (Technical Contact) Dulles, VA, USA
Apr.10,2002 Eritrean Islamic Jihad
(Ethiopia/Somalia) www.eijm.org/ 208.185.95.25 Abovenet Communications
San Jose, CA, USA DNS Solutions (Technical Contact) Midway, UT, USA
Apr.10,2002 Islamic Resistance
Martyr's Brigade
www.moqawama.tv/ 208.231.7.172 SkyNetWEB
Baltimore, MD, USA Baydoun, Hussein Beirut, LB
Apr.10,2002 Cyber-Terrorism:
Muslim Hackers Club
www.ummah.net/mhc 217.173.79.12 BandLabs Limited
London, UK The Ummah Trust
Ahmed, S. H. Harrow, Middlesex, UK
Apr.10,2002 Tanzeem
www.tanzeem.org 216.26.163.12 MaximumASP
Louisville, KY, USA P & H Virtual Computing Fairless Hills, PA, USA
Apr.10,2002 Laskar Jihad
Indonesian Jihad www.laskarjihad.or.id 216.74.100.93 Time Warner Telecom
Brookfield, WI, USA Arif Rahman Indonesia
Mar.06,2002 Islamic Association
for Palestine
www.iap.org 63.175.194.197 Sprint
Reston, VA, USA Kazem, Rawhi Mississauga, On, Canada
Apr.10,2002 Islami Jamiat Talba
(Kashmir Mujahideen)
www.jamiat.org 63.99.209.24
Ready Hosting
Kenosha WI, USA Badruddin, Shoib Karachi, Pakistan
Apr.10,2002 Hizbullah
www.hizbulla.net 208.231.7.173 SkyNetWEB
Baltimore MD, USA Mohamad Hejazi Beirut, Lebanon
Apr.10,2002 Hizbulla
(Arabic news from Hizbullah) www.hizbulla.org
www.imamsadrnews.net 209.61.170.173 Rackspace.com
San Antonio, TX, USA Mohamad Hejazi Beirut, Lebanon
Mar.06,2002 Hamas
www.palestine-info.com/hamas 209.204.204.153 OLM.net
Milford, CT, USA Sadaqa, Ziyad (billing, administrator) Orlando, FL, USA
Apr.04,2002 Al-Qassam Martyr's Brigade
(Military wing of Hamas) www.qassam.org/ 216.40.224.141 Everyones Internet
Houston, Texas, USA Aljazirah Net Saudi Arabia
Mar.06,2002 Markaz Ad-Da'wah Wal Irshad
(Lashkar-e-Taiba) Kashmir Mujahideen
www.markazdawa.org 203.128.6.167 Brain Computer (Pakistani company but server is in
Singapore) Department of Super Computing and Defence Automation (no longer in operation, but website is still up) Qabul, Afganistan
Mar.06,2002 Ummah News
www.ummahnews.com 63.149.48.148 Qwest Communications
Denver, CO Osman Muhammad London, UK
Mar.06,2002 ININ
www.inin.net 66.135.231.93 Pacific Interactive Honolulu, HI Islamic News and Information Network Longueuil, QC, Canada
Mar.06,2002 Maktabah
www.maktabah.net 62.253.235.184 Information Removed
Maktabah Al Ansaar Birmingham, UK
Nov.29,2001 Jihad Islami
jihadislami.com
(archive.org Nov. 29,2001) (Not in operation) was Chicago, IL, USA aljihad
SiteProtect

www.lajnah22me.co.uk
members.lycos.co.uk/mojahedeen/
members.lycos.co.uk/saout/vb/
members.lycos.co.uk/brameg/vb/forum.php
members.lycos.co.uk/laalahalaalah/
modjahede.5.forumer.com/
66.148.85.36/vb/
ekhlaas.com/forum/
alamal.4.forumer.com/index.php?act=idx
/www.qal3ati.com/vb/
www.hkmah.net/
www.islam4.net/vb/
www.3asfh.com/vb/
www.hakayk.com/vb/
/67.15.48.24/~ansarnet/vb/
www.al-hesbah.org/v/
www.almjlah.net/vb/
www.alezah.com/vb/
www.palestinianforum.net/forum/
mojahid.net/ib/
www.u-s-i.net/vb/
e3dad.000k2.com/
www.4muslm.com/home/modul...ame=Forums
firdaws.virtue.nu/
www.shawati.com/vb/
www.3asfh.com/vb/
www.ra23.com/vb/
www.alqa3edah.q6.net/
www.muslemon.com/vb/
/www.islah100.org/vboard/
www.muslemweb.com/Ib/
www.alshohda.com/montada/
www.alba6al.net/vb/forum.php?UserID=1
www.sfhty.com/montda.php?tid=6810
www.sfhty.com/montda.php?...&tid=10899
www.f2f2.org/jehad/
www.topde.com/vb/
www.asunnah.net/
aljunaibi1.jeeran.com/
www.beepworld.de/members49/siddiq/
www.alsham4all.com/vb/
www.aldair.net/forum/
www.sarayaalquds.cjb.net/
www.alrisalah.cjb.net/
66.148.85.35/vb/
www.alasra.org/bbs1/

iraq Islamic army web pageS, TRACING         Reply with quote Edit/Delete this post Delete this post View IP address of poster
iaiiraq- 3 messages TODAY, that are FORWARDED EMAILS. 11.6.04
AND THEY ARE BROADSCASTING THEM VIA rss
rss.groups.yahoo.com/group/iaiiraq/rss

spyair.4t.com/index.htm
happynews0.tripod.com/
likeyouiai.5u.com/
iaiiraq.hala.cc/
www.koolpages.com/992ali/us.htm
happynews0.tripod.com/me.htm

All these web sites lead to this yahoo group.
Their yahoo group.
groups.yahoo.com/group/iaiiraq/

Messages in the clear:
groups.yahoo.com/group/iaiiraq/messages

00447787773555
The number specified for the mobile shipments
00442084520303
The Movement for Islamic Reform office

Page listed in messages??
www.megago.com/l/?


www.naseh.net/naseh.net/a...1085.shtml


nullpo.mydns.jp/up/updir/155.wmv
Zip file their info?
www.sofir.org/reports/13o...LR.doc.zip
members.lycos.co.uk/xp10vip/t001.zip
amari.ath.cx/upload2/source/lama0165.zip
stv.zive.net/nup/source/up0017.zip

other links:
69.57.139.177/cgi-bin/moj...com&p=6187

RELATED:
/www.qal3ati.com/vb/showt...post524622
Saudi Opposition TV Channel Al-Islah Observed to Carry Test Transmission
December 31, 2003

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA, TV station Al-Islah was observed to be broadcasting on-screen captions and a ticker-tape on 22 December. The on-screen ticker-tape says that it is a test transmission. The audio carries the same religious song (on Mecca, Jerusalem predicament of Muslims). On-screen information includes:

"- The channel broadcast on four different satellites:
1. Intelsat 707.
2. Telstar 12.
3. Panamsat.
4. Hellas Sat 2."

For direct or recorded participation it gives the following number:
00442082081141. It also provides telephone number: 00442084520303.

- Fax: 00442084520808.
- Internet address: tv @ islah.org
- Web site: www.islah.tv

The screen shows the following captions: "Welcome to Al-Islah experimental broadcasting. We ask those of you who are able to receive the channel to inform others on details of how to receive it. The experimental broadcasting will continue until the channel's audiences are able to receive it on the aforementioned satellites."

End of monitor's report.


it would be nice if we had an Arbic member to check this out.

Donations via paypal: listed in yahoo pages posts.
to tajdeed@tajdeed.net, Party for Islamic Renewal (www.tajdeed.net)

Translated from italian:

The army Muslim in Iraq and the Cdlr
there is a connection between the Army Muslim that has killed Enzo Baldoni and Yasser Tawfiq To the Sirri, the Egyptian who lives to thought London the megaphone of To the Qaeda in Europe. The traces left on the net web concur of riconstruire the possible tie between Great Britain and the group that in Iraq the from Milan journalist has killed French and still stops the two reporter Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot ".

To how much Sarzanini reports, the elements collected from the Italian intelligence "open new scenes" thanks to which become the hypothesis more and more concrete that the rapimenti "become part in the strategy of the terror lead from the men of Osama bin Laden".

The doubt is that the Italian intelligence has been limited to find, and to diffuse, one study completed from the Society for Internet 13 published Research October with the title it The Islamic Army in Iraq and the CDLR . In the analysis every signal lacks curious to the dominion www.iai.i8.com where the 8 september October is published for before turns the photo of the body of Enzo Baldoni. Of continuation we bring back the integral translation of the document:

Summary
There is a trace left in post on the forum the Muslims, in the newsgroup of Yahoo and in the famous recordings of situated Muslims that put in relation a new actor of the industry of the seizures in Iraq with an important group close to to the Qaeda of Saudis leaves the country to you in United Kingdom.

Body
1. The Army Muslim in Iraq (Iai) has been introduced for before the time when kidnapped or it has bought two French journalists in the attempt to abolish the prohibition tax from the French government to wear religious symbols in the public schools as an example ( the hijab ).
As a result of this episode has been taken or buys other hostages to you, online with the strategy total Muslim (as an example the kidnapped Italian hostages in order to change Italian politics in Iraq, the indonesiani hostages in order to obtain the release of a indonesiano terrorist in jail etc.)

2. The Iai has a situated Internet that is moved from a provider free to an other and a eGroup of Yahoo
First situated: iaminiraq.tripod.com/- suspended
According to situated: www.wanthim.i8.com/- suspended
Third situated one: happynews0.tripod.com/ - active
Fourth situated one: iaiiraq.hala.cc/- under construction
Yahoo group: groups.yahoo.com/group/iaiiraq/ - active

First the situated one has been announced from Al-I' lam Al-Islami username, a member of long date of the forum of To Ansar (currently all?indirizzo ansarnet.ws/vb/)

3. The situated one of the Iai promotes the newsgroup of Yahoo and an analysis of the post begins them on the newsgroup of Yahoo of the Iai supplies the following information:

to. the first one post, and therefore the probable owner of the newsgroup of Yahoo, uses the same Al-I' name Al-Islami blades like username.
b. from the post laughed them to Great Britain
c. the post they have been sent from one of following addresses email:

marsad@marsad.net
marsad@marsad.org.uk
marsad@marsad.fsnet.co.uk

4. Marsad acts like several megaphone to extremists Muslims, comprised those of To the Qaeda, but not only. Marsad means "observatory" and could be an historical reference to an observatory in function to Samarcanda in the Middle Ages. Currently they report to an organization known like Islamic Observatory Center or like Islamic Informative Observatory (in Arab: Al-Marsad al-I`lami al-Islami )

Recordings WHOIS connect the dominions of Marsad to the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (Cdlr), an important organization Saudi Muslim with center to London.

From the recording of marsad.net:

Domain Name: MARSAD.NET
Administrative Contact:
Al-Siri, Yasser cdlr@cdlr.net
BM.Box: CDLR
London, London WC1N 3XX UK

From the recording of the dominion marsad.org.uk:

Domain Name: marsad.org.uk
Registrant: IOC
BM.Box: CDLR
London WC1N 3XX GB

From recording WHOIS of cdlr.net:

Domain Name: CDLR.NET
Administrative Contact:
Al-Massari, Anmar anmar@telinco.co.uk
100 Carlton Avenue East
Wembley
Middlesex, HA9 8LY
UK
0208 9083064

5. Between the figures it centers them in the Cdlr are:
Yasser Al-sires, a famous bad one who has been condemned a.morte in absentia in Egypt for its role of leader in jihad the Muslim and for the murder of Anwar Sadat. Its figure has been also put in relation with the murder of Massud in Afghanistan the 9 september 2001.

Mahammed Al-Massari general secretary of the Cdlr, directly been involved in the Al-Marsad organization al-I' blades al-Islami organization and associate of long date of Osama bin Laden.. More recently teorizzato the legittimit of the eventual homicide of the first English minister Tony Blair.

Majid and Anmar Al-Massari, sons of Mohammed Al-Massari. They are both programmatori and sure they have the technical abilities in order to manage the situated ones web of the Iai and in order to communicate in relatively sure way with the Iai in Iraq. Majid currently is guarded from the United States in order to have violato the norms on immigration. Anmar is therefore remained the most probable responsible than the operations via Internet of the Iai.

Anmar Al-Massari is titular of the dominions anmar.org and linux-team.org, and of address email anmar@anmar.org:

From the WHOIS of anmar.org:

Created On: 09-Apr-2000 21: 29: 14 UTC
Registrant Name: Anmar Al-Massari
Registrant Organization: CDLR
Registrant Street1: 100 Carlton Avenue East
Registrant Street2: Wembley
Registrant City: Middlesex
Registrant Postal Tails: HA98LY
Registrant Country: GB
Registrant Phone: +44.2089083064

From the WHOIS of linux-team.org:

Domain Name:LINUX-TEAM.ORG
Created On:31-Jan-2001 21:00:03 UTC
Registrant Name:Anmar Al-Massari
Registrant Organization:CDLR
Registrant Street1:100 Carlton Avenue East
Registrant Street2:Wembley
Registrant City:Middlesex
Registrant Postal Code:HA98LY
Registrant Country:GB
Registrant Phone:+44.2089083064
Registrant Email:anmar@telinco.co.uk

Conclusions :
Distinguished from the concurrent organizations like Tahid wal guided Jihad they give to the Zarqawi, the Army Muslim in Iraq seems to use the hostages in order to promote a total strategy that goes beyond the beam d?azione of the jihad irachena and of the Countries that support the government iracheno. E' clearly that someone rapisce and withholds these hostages. Not there is no certainty, instead, on the fact that the Iai is a true organization and not only a "name of convenience" that could be used from anyone. While the connection between the Cdlr and the situated ones web of the Iai is clear, it remains opened the issue on the possible involvement of members of the Cdlr in the jihad irachena beyond to Internet.

Connected email adrs:
iaiiraq@hotmail.com
iaiiraq@yahoo.com

RELATED:
Voice of the Mujahidin Available on Satellite
March 10, 2004

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On 9 March BBC Monitoring observed Voice of the Mujahidin on the Hotbird 3 satellite at 13 degrees east, 12437 MHz, horizontal polarization, audio PID 257.

The station uses facilities in Iran to broadcast Arabic programming for Iraq on 720 kHz mediumwave and 90.1 MHz FM. There is also a live audio stream available on their web site at www.radiomojahedin.com.

Source: BBC Monitoring research 10 Mar 04 (BBCM Mar 10, 2004)


Gerald
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Special Issue on Zarqawi:
james town
Originally a gangster with a drug habit and propensity for sexual
assault, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is an unlikely Salafist militant. His
murky origins, combined with his sudden projection into the limelight
on the eve of the invasion of Iraq and the grisly exploits of his
organization in that country have ensured that much of the
information on the man and his organization are often inaccurate or
misleading. This special is designed to provide timely and accurate
information and analysis on the man who is increasingly touted as the
United States' most dangerous adversary in Iraq. The range of
articles presented here discuss and assess a number of acutely
relevant topics; including Zarqawi's background, the precise nature
of his relationship with al-Qaeda, enmity towards the Jordanian
regime and the more eccentric misinformation campaigns that have
centered on him. It also becomes apparent, throughout this collection
of articles, that Zarqawi's Achilles' heel truly is his lack of
vision and the weak ideology underpinning his operations.


----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch

By Gary Gambill

In the span of just eighteen months, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has emerged
from obscurity to eclipse Osama bin Laden as public enemy number one
in the Bush administration's war on terror. Less gifted than bin
Laden in nearly every way, Zarqawi rose to become the "emir" of
radical Islamist terror groups in Iraq largely on the strength of his
networking skills. While probably not the terrorist mastermind he is
often made out to be, Zarqawi is responsible for forging the broad
outlines of a seemingly effective terrorist strategy for derailing
Iraq's postwar political transition.

Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah in October 1966 to a
family of modest means in the working class Jordanian town of Zarqa,
16 miles northeast of Amman. Contrary to many Western media reports,
he is not of Palestinian descent the Khalaylah clan is a branch of
the Bani Hassan, a large East Bank bedouin tribe loyal to Jordan's
Hashemite royal family. Zarqawi's father, a local mukhtar (mayor) and
retired army officer, died in 1984, leaving his mother a small
pension to raise six daughters and four sons.

Devastated by the death of his father, the seventeen-year-old
adolescent dropped out of school and descended into a life of
drinking, drug abuse, and violence on the streets of Zarqa. He soon
ran afoul of the authorities and was jailed for drug possession and
sexual assault. Ironically, it was probably his criminal activities
that first drew him into the city's abject and lawless Palestinian
refugee camp, where he was exposed to radical Salafist preachers. He
quickly fell under their influence and gave up drugs and alcohol.
After acquiring a clerical job in the local municipality, he married
one of his maternal cousins.

In 1989, however, Zarqawi abruptly left his family to go to
Afghanistan. By this time, Soviet troops had already pulled out of
the country evidently he was expecting to join a triumphant march
on Kabul and witness the establishment of the world's first Sunni
Islamist state. Instead, he saw the Mujahideen front fragment along
tribal and ethnic lines, unable to deliver the coup de grace to
the "godless" Soviet-installed regime in Kabul for three years.
Zarqawi is believed to have taken part in some fighting, but he
mainly worked as a correspondent for a radical Islamist magazine
during this period. By 1991, he was spending most of his time in
Peshawar, Pakistan once a way station for Arab volunteers going to
Afghanistan, now teeming with disillusioned Arab fighters debating
what to do next.

It is here that Zarqawi came under the influence of Muhammad al-
Maqdisi (aka Issam al-Barqawi), a well-known radical Salafist thinker
and fellow Jordanian. Together they established a network called
Bayat al-Imam to organize Jordanian Afghan veterans. After the fall
of Kabul in 1992, as rival Mujahideen commanders finally "liberated"
the Afghan capital only to turn their guns on each other and tear the
city to shreds, Zarqawi and Maqdisi returned to Jordan to prepare for
a jihad closer to home.

One thing that Zarqawi had not learned from Afghanistan's swaggering
militia environment was how to operate discretely. Upon his return,
he began publicly condemning the government and denouncing mainstream
clerics who supported it a bad idea made worse by the fact that he
had been naively stockpiling weapons and explosives in his own home.
In March 1994, security forces raided his house, discovered the arms
cache and arrested him. Zarqawi was brought before the state security
court on charges of membership in an illegal organization and weapons
possession a predicament that might not have been so dire had he
treated the court respectfully. He did not. "[Zarqawi] handed me a
written indictment. The first defendant in this bill was the late His
Majesty King Hussein and the second was meI was expected to inform
the first defendant of the charges," recalls the judge who presided
over the trial. [1] Zarqawi was sentenced to 15 years in jail with
hard labor and sent to Suwaqa prison, where he was soon joined by
Maqdisi.

Maqdisi quickly established a loyal following among the prisoners,
with Zarqawi (who worked out incessantly with buckets of rocks)
acting as his enforcer. Over time, however, the focus of the
prisoners' loyalty shifted decidedly to Zarqawi and a power struggle
erupted between the two. While Maqdisi was far more respected as a
spiritual leader than his disciple (whose single greatest learned
achievement was memorizing the Qur'an) and his background earned him
considerable sympathy from the predominantly Palestinian prisoners,
Zarqawi's military experience and courage in confronting guards and
rival prisoner factions were much more important assets in a prison
environment and he eventually became the group's undisputed leader.

Zarqawi's leadership style blended authoritarian and compassionate
tendencies. He imposed strict rules on his disciples they had to
dress identically (Afghan-style robes, beards, short hair, black head
cloths), could watch only news broadcasts on television, could read
only books that he pre-approved, and were not allowed to socialize
with non-Islamist prisoners or even speak to each other in his
presence without permission. However, stories also abound of
Zarqawi's devotion to his followers. On one occasion, he flew into a
rage and attacked a guard who was beating one of his disciples. He
was "well-known for loving his brothers in God more than his
relatives," recalls one Jordanian Islamist who knew him well. [2]
When an Islamist whose legs had been blown off in a terror attack was
brought to the prison, Zarqawi personally bathed and took care of the
new arrival. Former friends and associates also remember him as very
emotional and easily moved to tears.

In May 1999, following the ascension of King Abdullah II, Zarqawi was
released as part of a sweeping amnesty. However, in a replay of Saudi
and Egyptian efforts to "export" their violent Islamist opposition,
Jordanian intelligence incessantly harassed Zarqawi and other newly
released Islamist detainees, preventing them from getting jobs or
starting businesses. Several months after his release, Zarqawi left
the country and returned to Peshawar. Interestingly, he brought his
ailing mother with him in hopes that the climate there would help her
battle with leukemia. When his visa expired six months later,
however, he was arrested and ordered to leave the country. While his
mother flew back to Jordan, Zarqawi crossed the border into
Afghanistan for the first time in eight years.

Shortly after entering the country, Zarqawi met with bin Laden and
other al-Qaeda leaders in Kandahar and asked them for support in
establishing a terror network aimed at overthrowing the Jordanian
monarchy. It appears that they assisted him substantially by late
2000 he had established his own training camp near Herat in Western
Afghanistan, catering mainly to exiled Jordanian, Palestinian, and
Syrian Islamists in Europe. As his network developed, Zarqawi
abandoned his exclusive focus on overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy
in part because some operatives refused to go back to Jordan,
preferring instead to plot attacks against Israel or Jewish targets
in Europe.

While Zarqawi's network by this time known as al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
(Monotheism and Holy War) was not completely independent of al-
Qaeda, it was clearly autonomous. Zarqawi's men "refused to march
under the banner of another individual or group," recalls Nu'man bin-
Uthman, a Libyan Islamist leader now living in London who was in
contact with Zarqawi at the time. [3] Zarqawi's choice of Herat as a
base of operations was significant it allowed him to bypass
Pakistani way stations into Afghanistan used by al-Qaeda and instead
create his own highly sophisticated "underground railroad" to ferry
operatives between Europe and Afghanistan through the eastern Iranian
city of Mashhad. According to the interrogations of captured Tawhid
operatives in Germany, the two networks' fundraising branches
competed with each other in Europe.

Zarqawi's Iranian connections paid off in the aftermath of 9/11, he
and most of his operatives in Afghanistan were able to cross overland
into Iran. However, his efforts to resume operations there backfired.
In February 2002, three Tawhid operatives on a mission to carry out
bomb attacks against Israel were arrested crossing into Turkey from
Iran; their interrogation alerted Western intelligence agencies to
Zarqawi's presence in the Islamic Republic. Pressure on Iran to expel
Zarqawi intensified in April after eight Tawhid members were arrested
in Germany for plotting terrorist attacks against Jewish targets.

Weeks later, Zarqawi was obliged to relocate to a remote area of
northern Iraq controlled by the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-
Islam. A number of Arab Islamists had already set up camp in the
mountainous enclave and Zarqawi quickly joined forces with them.
Believing that an American invasion to oust Saddam Hussein was
inevitable, Zarqawi began preparing the groundwork for the battle
ahead. He spent a considerable part of the summer in Baghdad and the
so-called Sunni triangle of Iraq, apparently to establish local
support networks. Since Iran was no longer a reliable conduit for the
travel of Tawhid operatives, Zarqawi spent time in Syria setting up
an alternate route.

During or shortly before the American-led invasion of Iraq in March
2003, Zarqawi returned to Iran, where he met with bin Laden's
military chief, Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi (Saif al-Adel), who asked him
to coordinate the entry of al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq through
Syria. Zarqawi readily agreed and by the fall of 2003 a steady flow
of Arab Islamists were infiltrating Iraq via Syria. Although many of
these foreign fighters were not members of Tawhid, they became more
or less dependent on Zarqawi's local contacts once they entered the
unfamiliar country. Moreover, given Tawhid's superior intelligence
gathering capability, it made little sense for non-Tawhid operatives
to plan and carry out attacks without coordinating with Zarqawi's
lieutenants. Consequentially, Zarqawi came to be recognized as the
regional "emir" of Islamist terrorists in Iraq without (until last
month) having sworn fealty to bin Laden.

In essence, Zarqawi has pursued a four-pronged terror strategy in
Iraq. The first track of this strategy is intended to pressure
international actors into rescinding their support for Iraq's
American-led transition. The truck bombing of the UN headquarters in
Baghdad in August 2003 effectively ended the UN involvement on the
ground in Iraq; other targets have included the Jordanian embassy in
Baghdad (August 2003) and the headquarters of Italy's paramilitary
police headquarters in Nasiriyah.

The second is designed to deter Iraqis from supporting the US-led
transition. Zarqawi operatives have carried out numerous car bomb
attacks on police stations and recruitment centers, killing hundreds,
and have assassinated several leading Iraqi politicians.

The third is designed to obstruct Iraq's reconstruction by abducting
and beheading civilian contractors, humanitarian aid workers, and
other foreigners in Iraq and distributing the gruesome videos of
their executions over the Internet. Zarqawi's network pioneered this
practice with the execution in May of Nicholas Berg (who Zarqawi
himself beheaded) and carried out at least ten subsequent killings,
while other al-Qaeda-linked groups are believed responsible for
another two dozen murders.

The fourth track of Zarqawi's strategy is the string of deadly car
bomb attacks outside Shiite mosques (most recently, Hamid al-Najar
mosque in Baghdad on December 3) that have killed hundreds of
worshippers. These attacks are not intended to punish or deter
collaboration with the coalition they are deliberately
indiscriminate. In his January 2004 letter to bin Laden, Zarqawi
explains their purpose: "Targeting and striking their religious,
political, and military symbols, will make them show their rage
against the Sunnis and bear their inner vengeance. If we succeed in
dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy
Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death." [4]

While Zarqawi's brutal methods appeal to many radical Sunni
Islamists, they have begun to spark considerable controversy in the
Arab world. Iraqi insurgent leaders in Iraq frequently complain that
Zarqawi's brutality has detracted from international sympathy for
their cause. The Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq has
repeatedly condemned the beheading of foreign hostages as a violation
of Islamic law. [5] Zarqawi's defense that the Prophet Muhammad
ordered the killing of prisoners after the Battle of Badr is not
seen as very persuasive by most Islamic scholars. [6] Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, a well-known Egyptian cleric living in Qatar, has compared
Zarqawi to the ancient Kharijites, "who used to pray and fast all the
time . . . but read the Qur'an without understanding it." [7]

Zarqawi's mass murder of Shiites has puzzled many informed observers,
since he was suspected of having loose ties with Iranian intelligence
until recently and al-Qaeda has scrupulously avoided targeting
Shi'as. Some speculate that the poorly educated Zarqawi has been
heavily influenced by one of his close associates in Iraq, Mustafa
Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Musab al-Suri), a prominent Syrian-born
radical Islamist ideologue known for his rabid hatred of heterodox
Islamic sects. Whether Zarqawi's wanton killing of Shiites precludes
cooperation with maverick Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is not
entirely clear. Sadr, whose militia has battled coalition forces off
and on over the past year, appears reluctant to unequivocally rule
this out his spokesman in Baghdad recently claimed that atrocities
attributed to Zarqawi are actually the work of Israeli intelligence.
[8]

Gary C. Gambill, a political analyst for Freedom House and adjunct
professor at College of Mount Saint Vincent, has published widely on
Lebanese and Syrian affairs. He is the former editor of Middle East
Intelligence Bulletin.

Notes:
1. Documentary interview, LBCI Satellite TV (Beirut), 27 November
2004.
2. Documentary interview, Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), 1 July 2004.
3. Al-Hayat (London), 8 November 2004.
4. Agence France Presse, 12 February 2004.
5. Interview with Muthanna Harith al-Dari, Al-Dustour (Amman), 2
November 2004.
6. Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), 12 May 2004.
7. Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), 3 October 2004.
8. Interview with Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji, Al-Manar TV (Beirut), 2
December 2004.

* * *


Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to al-Qaeda: From Mu'askar al-Battar,
Issue 21

Translation by Jamestown Researcher Jeffrey Pool

Translator's Introduction: On October 17, 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and his Tawhid wal-Jihad organization issued an online statement
pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda and its commander, Sheikh Osama bin
Laden. Al-Qaeda reprinted and acknowledged the statement, responding
favorably to the new development in their online magazine Mu'askar al-
Battar. The newly-affiliated group is known as Tanzim Qai'dat al-
Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq), and has already
claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the December
13 bombing at an entrance to Baghdad's Green Zone.

The bay'ah (oath of allegiance) has been deemed authentic by US
military and intelligence analysts, and was further reaffirmed by al-
Qaeda's public acknowledgement. For this reason, Jamestown has chosen
to print a translated version of the segment from al-Battar, in the
interest of providing its readership with primary material on key
developments in global terror.

Osama bin Laden and his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri have endorsed
and praised Zarqawi and the Iraqi insurgency in the past, and Zarqawi
has been happy to acknowledge these remarks, while carefully
maintaining his subordinate role in the greater mission and
demonstrating his willingness to show loyalty. Many conclusions can
be drawn from the text: firstly, Zarqawi's oath challenges past
perceptions of rivalry between his organization and al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan. Secondly, it demonstrates his desire to establish
himself as a key player in al-Qaeda's mission in Iraq. Finally, the
text serves as a recruiting statement for the Iraqi insurgency,
through the endorsement of al-Qaeda leadership.

* * *

"Hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be divided." (Qur'an
3:103)

Praise be to God, the Cherisher and Sustainer of worlds, and let
there be no aggression except upon the oppressors; and peace and
blessings be upon our beloved Prophet Mohammed, son of Abdullah, and
upon all his family and companions.

It should bring great joy to the people of Islam, especially those on
the front lines, and it was with good tidings of support during this
blessed month that Tawhid wal-Jihad's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
(God protect him) and his followers announced their allegiance to the
Sheikh al-Mujahideen of our time, Abu Abdullah Osama bin Laden, God
protect him.

God said the following: Hold fast to the rope of God and you shall
not be divided.

The order was given to unite the major jihadi organizations with
their counterparts in Iraq, and more significantly, the Jamaah
Salafiyah united with Tawhid wal-Jihad. Then this [newly unified]
blessed group pledged allegiance to mujahid commander Abu Abdullah
[Osama bin Laden] (God protect and help him).

This is undoubtedly an indication that victory is approaching, God
willing, and that it represents a return to the glorious past. We
shall, with great fury, instill fear in the enemies of Islam, who
consider that through their war in Iraq they have nearly uprooted
Islam from its recent stronghold. For this, we will turn [the war]
into a hell for them.

The land of Babylon, as it is called by the Jews and their
compatriots in the extreme American right who perpetrate the war, is
not the piece of cake expected by the people. Rather, they wish a
return to the year 2001, for even though they suffered great losses,
there is no doubt that those resulting from the blessed [9/11]
attacks are not on the scale of their defeat in Iraq, God willing.
They have thrown their weight around in this Muslim land, deciding
that it would be the cornerstone in their plan which they named `the
Greater Middle East' in their effort to impose their infidel
democracy, transform the peoples of the region and uproot Islam [from
it]; however God will shame them and forsake them, grace and praise
be unto Him.

[...]

On a memorable, historic day in this holy month, Sunday the third of
Ramadan to be specific, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi- the known Islamic
leader- pledged allegiance to the mujahid sheikh Osama bin Laden, to
hear and obey for better or worse, and to the cause of jihad until
all of Islam is in God's service.

The Iraqi mujahideen issued a statement to this effect, reprinted
here in its entirety:

Praise be to God who has united the ranks of the mujahideen and
disperses the forces of the infidels, and praise be to God who
said: "hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be divided".
Blessings and peace be upon he who, through God, united the hearts of
believers, and who stood as a bulwark in the face of the enemies of
Islam (they are severe against disbelievers, and merciful among
themselves), and upon his family and companions, who raised the sword
of truth against the propagators of falsehood.

Numerous messages were passed between `Abu Musab' (God protect him)
and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing
a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than
God chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda
came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization
in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their
hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission.

With the appearance of Ramadan, the month of the gift of victories,
Muslims are compelled to join forces and be a stick in the eye of
Islam's enemies.

[Let it be known that] al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders
and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh "Osama bin Laden"
(in word and in deed) and to jihad for the sake of God until there is
no more discord [among the ranks of Islam] and all of the religion
turns toward God.

For we have heard the words of our Prophet, whom we believe and
trust, (let the world not succumb to baseness and depravity), and we
have seen the absurdity of today's political leaders. We are waiting
in regard to his final promise on succession:

"Prophethood will remain with you for as long as God wills it to
remain, then God will raise it up wherever He wills to raise it up.
Afterward, there will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of
Prophethood remaining with you for as long as God wills it to remain.
Then, He will raise it up whenever He wills to raise it up.
Afterward, there will be a reign of violently oppressive rule [unjust
Muslim kings] and it will remain as long as God wills it. Then, there
will be a reign of tyrannical rule and it will remain for as long as
God wills it to remain. Then God will raise it up whenever He wills
to raise it up. Finally there will be a caliphate that follows the
guidance of Prophethood."

By God, O sheikh of the mujahideen, if you bid us plunge into the
ocean, we would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If
you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a
fine commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate
infidels and apostates!

Now then, people of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of
the mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry [`there is no
God but the one God'], as the flag waves, raised by our newest
heroes. Let us cleanse all Muslim lands of every infidel and wicked
apostate until Islam enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.

Thus ends the statement, and it reminds us of the Companions and of
the heroes of our great people, for this written message is like
those from the history of Islam. It returns us to the time of the
Prophet (God bless him and grant him salvation) and his Companions
(may God be pleased with them), and so for God's sake, carry on, O
people of Jihad, and return to the people of Islam their lost glory,
doing that of which previous centuries were incapable.

It is worth mentioning that this oath of allegiance caused
frustration and alarm among the American leadership. As one counter-
terror official stated, "it is certain that this is not a step
forward toward American security, but its effects thus far remain to
be seen". A Pentagon official clarified that the Army would attempt
to restrict the means of distributing Zarqawi's statement.


* * *




Unraveling Zarqawi's al-Qaeda Connection

By Gordon Corera

An October 17th statement posted on an Islamist website and published
in al-Qaeda's military journal Mu`askar al-Battar claiming to be from
the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) group led by Abu Musab Al-
Zarqawi began with a personal pledge of allegiance from Zarqawi and
his fighters to Osama bin Laden: "[Let it be known that] al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid
commander, Sheikh "Osama bin Laden"... Numerous messages were passed
between `Abu Musab' (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood
over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No
sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose to restore them, and
our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the
strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of
the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its
methods and overall mission." [1]

After this, JTJ began issuing statements of responsibility under its
new name Tanzim Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in
Iraq). At the time, some Islamist circles expressed doubt about the
statement's authenticity suggesting that it was part of a US-inspired
campaign to associate the violence in Iraq with "international
terrorism" rather than "legitimate" nationalist insurgency. [2] But
the identities of the posters as well as the language and style
indicated that the messages were from Zarqawi's group. U.S.
intelligence sources say they are confident of the validity of the
original pledge.

The statements marked a surprising twist in the long, complex and
disputed tale of Zarqawi's links with al-Qaeda. Few have doubted that
there has been contact, but the generally accepted view so far has
been that Zarqawi constructed his own parallel network which may have
in some ways been in competition, or at the very least independent
of, al-Qaeda.

Historically, the links were limited. According to an interview in Al-
Hayat a former Afghan jihadist claims that Zarqawi was not a well-
known or significant fighter in Afghanistan during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. [3] He participated with a number of jihadi fighters in
the battlefront at Khost, where a number of Jordanians fought, but
had no identifiable links to al-Qaeda as it began to emerge.


After spending some time in a Jordanian prison, Zarqawi returned to
Afghanistan and subsequently established a training camp in the
western city of Herat. Though he apparently assembled 80 to 100
people, largely Palestinians and Jordanians committed to jihad but
with no formal name for the group, there is not thought to have been
any links to al-Qaeda at this time. Evidence gathered from Shadi
Abdullah, an Islamist arrested in Germany in 2002, even points to
competition between Zarqawi and bin Laden for recruits during this
period, though Zarqawi seemed far more focused on overthrowing the
Jordanian regime and recruited almost exclusively Palestinians and
Jordanians.

After the U.S. attacked the Taliban, Zarqawi moved first to Iran. He
was then pressured to move on and traveled just over the border into
Iraqi Kurdistan as the only available place for refuge. Here he
developed links with a new generation of Salifists who had not fought
in the original Afghan jihad, including Ansar al-Islam, which had
established itself on the Iranian border and taken control of a
number of villages. Reports from militants claim that Iran was
concerned over their location and asked them to move three miles from
the border to avoid any direct contact between Iranians and the Ansar
forces. Jihadist fighters then flowed into Northern Iraq from
Afghanistan and Pakistan through Iran. [4]

In his February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council, the
U.S. Secretary of State described Zarqawi as "an associate and
collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants."
Although Secretary Powell was careful not to call him a formal member
of al-Qaeda, Zarqawi was depicted as a key link in the evidence
designed to outline an association between Saddam Hussein and Osama
bin Laden. But firm evidence of strong links either way to Saddam
on the one side and to al-Qaeda on the other is largely absent.

Since the formal end of the Iraq war in April 2003, many of the most
high-profile attacks, in particular suicide bombings and kidnappings
have been attributed to Zarqawi's organization. But some question
whether Zarqawi is really as significant in organizing the insurgency
as portrayed. It is helpful for the U.S. to personalize the
insurgency and emphasize the role of foreign fighters because doing
so provides a link to al-Qaeda while obscuring the
essentially "nationalist" character of the Iraqi insurgency. For the
Iraqi interim government it is also helpful to emphasize
international links because it diminishes the sense that there is a
domestic Sunni-led insurgency against the state and that Iraqis are
willing to kill each other.

Though Zarqawi and his fighters numerically make a small proportion
of the resistance (estimates run from 50 to 500), they exercise an
exaggerated degree of influence due to their coupling of extreme
violence with an acute understanding of the power of the media;
tactics which have developed in symmetry and through close
observation of other international terrorist groups including al-
Qaeda and its offshoots in Saudi Arabia. Over the summer of 2004 with
Osama bin Laden yet to appear and Zarqawi carrying out increasingly
bloody and high profile attacks, some began to question whether
Zarqawi was beginning to rival or even succeed bin Laden.

So what explains the October 2004 pledge of loyalty? The message
claims that talks have been going on for eight months between al-
Qaeda and Zarqawi which encountered many interruptions as Jama'at al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad explained its strategy before the final offer of
loyalty. Zarqawi is alleged to have sought al-Qaeda support in the
past but without success. In January 2004, an individual was captured
carrying a 17-page letter on a CD thought to be written by Zarqawi
calling for help from al-Qaeda in fomenting a sectarian war in Iraq.
The implication was that Zarqawi's group was independent but
nonetheless looking for support as the tone was at once supplicatory
but also written as if from one equal to another.


The letter said that Zarqawi's group had "our backs to the sea, the
enemy before us" and "we do not see ourselves as fit to challenge
you," but instead seek to "work under your banner, comply with your
orders." U.S. officials said they believed al-Qaeda had rebuffed
these advances but there are some doubts over the provenance and
authorship of the letter.


Various explanations have emerged for the October pledge. One senior
U.S. counter-terrorism official told the author in early November
2004 that it may be a sign of weakness, a view which is supported by
the January letter. The view is based on the supposition that groups
like Zarqawi's would prefer to retain their independence and autonomy
to enhance their maneuverability and ability to attract recruits and
funding. Any decision to associate themselves with another group is
thus indicative of internal and external pressures. They argue that
pressure on Fallujah as a base of operations and sanctuary for
Zarqawi forced him to reach out. Other Arab analysts contend that
Zarqawi was put under pressure by the growing al-Qaeda presence in
Iraq to subsume his organization under a broader movement.


Zarqawi is never described as a great thinker or religious ideologue.
One of those who knew him in prison said that he would attack other
inmates with his fists: "That's all he could do. He's not like bin
Laden with ideas and vision. He had no vision." Meanwhile,
ideologically there is not a total overlap between Zarqawi and bin
Laden. Both clearly subscribe to jihadist salafism, but Zarqawi's use
of violence has been more extreme and graphic. Historically, whilst
bin Laden in the last decade has focused on the far enemy of the
United States, Zarqawi has focused on enemies nearer at hand like the
Jordanian regime and now the interim Iraqi government.

One Arab who claimed to have recently met with Zarqawi in Fallujah
stated that Zarqawi's purpose was to turn Iraq into a new base of
operations to carry out further attacks in the region. "Rescuing
Jerusalem and the neighboring countries will come only after the rise
of an Islamic state from which the youth will set out to liberate the
neighboring areas," the Islamist Arab told Al-Hayat. [5]

The legitimacy of attacking Muslims looks to be the greatest
difference between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi. In particular, Zarqawi has
been more focused on fomenting sectarian strife within Iraq by
attacking the Shi'as. In an April 2004 message on a website
attributed to Zarqawi, he threatens to "kill their [Shi'a] imams and
cut off their heads" and describes the August 2003 killing of
Ayatatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim as a "generous act of God," as
Hakim was "full of deception and hostility to the people of Islam."
[6]

The problem for Zarqawi may be that the extreme levels of violence
which he uses could end up isolating him and his group. One former
jihadist compared him to the Algerian GIA in his willingness to
engage in mass slaughter of both personnel and civilians. In July,
Arabic media reported Iraqi intelligence sources saying that a number
of factions of the Iraqi resistance had cut their ties with Zarqawi
because of the level of civilian casualties he causes and because
they saw him as a "terrorist" rather than part of the "resistance."
Whether this is a problem for al-Qaeda is debatable, but the oath of
loyalty to bin Laden could hurt Zarqawi because it makes clear that
his group already led by a foreigner has an al-Qaeda dictated
international agenda and is no longer acting in the exclusive
interest of Iraqis.


Observers believe Zarqawi's organization is certain to continue
escalating its violence as the January elections approach, hoping in
particular to exacerbate sectarian tensions by exploiting Sunni fears
of Shi'a domination. The ability of the elections to draw communities
into the political process may be the ultimate determinant of
Zarqawi's durability, as his organization requires networks of local
support to survive. If a new government can gain some legitimacy then
that may well turn the tide against his group.

Gordon Corera is the BBC's Security Correspondent

Notes:
1. Translated by the Jamestown Foundation.
2. Diya Rashwan quoted in Al Quds al-Arabi, October 19, 2004
3. Al Hayat, London, November 8, 2004
4. Al Hayat, London, November 8, 2004
5. Al Hayat, London, September 10, 2004
6. Translated by BBC Monitoring.

* * *




Zarqawi's Jordanian Agenda

By Matthew Levitt and Julie Sawyer

Though most famous for funding and organizing suicide bombings and
beheadings in Iraq, Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah aka Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi has long assumed a leading role in terrorist operations in
other countries, including his native Jordan.


An East Banker and a member of the Bani Hassan tribe (one of the
largest in Jordan), Zarqawi is often denigrated as a "thug" by fellow
Jordanians [1]. Even after spending several years in Afghanistan in
his early twenties, Zarqawi remained little more than a violent
criminal until he met Abu Mohammed Maqdisi, a radical Palestinian
cleric and figurehead of the militant Bayat al-Imam network in
Jordan. In 1999, King Abdullah assumed the throne and issued a
general amnesty in which Zarqawi was freed. As of July 2004, Maqdisi
remained in a Jordanian prison, convicted of trying to overthrow the
government and establishing an Islamic caliphate.


After his release, Zarqawi moved to Pakistan, and then Afghanistan
where he ran a training camp near Herat. After 9/11, he settled in
northern Iraq where he met up with Jordanians from his hometown of
Zarqa and from the Suwaqa prison and established a training camp tied
to Ansar al-Islam. Zarqawi has been affiliated with several groups,
which over time have coalesced into one large network. These include
Jund al-Shams, Bayat al-Imam, Ansar al-Islam, al-Tawhid, Al-Tawhid
wal-Jihad, and most recently, al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers
(Iraq).

At the turn of the millennium, Zarqawi was involved in a plot to
target hotels frequented by Jewish and American tourists in Amman
during millennial celebrations. Zarqawi is believed to be behind the
failed assassination attempt in February 2002 of Ali Bourjaq, a
Jordanian secret-police official. In October 2002, Zarqawi planned
and facilitated the assassination of U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley in
Amman. According to the indictment of captured assassin, Salem Said
Bin Sewid, Zarqawi snuck into Jordan to personally recruit members of
the cell. In April 2004, Zarqawi was convicted for his role in the
plot along with Libyan and Jordanian attackers and four others.

One of Zarqawi's most successful operations targeting Jordanian
interests was the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad in
August 2003 an attack which killed at least fourteen people. While
Jordanian officials first maintained both in public statements and in
an interview with the author that Ahmed Chalabi or elements tied to
him were responsible for the attack, Jordanian authorities now
believe Zarqawi was behind this plot. [2]

The most spectacular of Zarqawi's plots was foiled, but would have
been considered a mega-terror attack had it not been. In April 2004,
Jordanian officials announced they had thwarted a major plot to
attack various locations in Amman, targeting Jordanians and
Americans. Zarqawi personally recruited the cell's leader, Azmi Al
Jayousi, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, along with several other
Jordanians and Syrians. The cell's targets included the Jordanian
General Intelligence Department (GID) Headquarters, the Prime
Ministry, and the U.S. Embassy in Amman. Hussein Sharif, one of the
operatives recruited by Jayousi, confessed that Jayousi told him that
the aim of the attack was to execute an operation that would "strike
at Jordan and the Hashemites, a war against the crusaders and
infidels."

The operation as planned was audacious not only in its targets, but
in the scale of the intended attack. Jordanian authorities maintain
that the twenty tons of explosives intended for the multiple
coordinated attacks contained more than ninety-two chemicals and
would have resulted not only in a large explosion but a chemical
cloud. Based on an analysis of the explosives that were confiscated,
Jordanian experts maintain that the bomb had the potential to injure
160,000 people. [3]

Just as disconcerting is the fact that this attack was largely funded
and facilitated by a logistical support network operating out of
Jordan and Syria. For example, Haithem Omar Ibrahim, a Syrian member
of the Zarqawi network, entered Jordan via Iraq and arranged safe
houses for the plotters where they lived for several months while
preparing the planned mega attack. During this time, the cell
manufactured 20 tons of explosives and organized the logistics of the
attacks.

Throughout, Jayousi remained in contact with Zarqawi by messengers,
most of whom traveled between Jordan and Iraq through Syria. One of
Zarqawi's most prominent aides, a Syrian named Suleiman Khaled
Darwish, supervised this communications channel, arranging for
couriers to deliver messages, forged passports and identity cards.
Jordanian intelligence further discovered that Zarqawi's network
would often send couriers with messages written in invisible ink on
paper currency carried in their wallets. [4] Passing messages on
bills of small denominations raised no alarms since anyone passing
through the border would be expected to have a small amount of cash
on their person. Zarqawi also used these couriers to send large
amounts of money presumed to have been raised in Europe and the
Persian Gulf states to fund the operation. According to Jayousi,
Zarqawi "started sending me money through messengers, payments of ten
and fifteen thousand, until I had a total of about $170 thousand; I
bought a large quantity of the material with that money."

The Jayousi plot was not the only time messengers and money were
smuggled across the Syrian-Jordanian border. Facilitated by several
key aides residing in the country, Zarqawi has made Syria a
springboard for his activities both in Iraq and Jordan. Already in
April 2003 Italian prosecutors warned that "Syria has functioned as a
hub for an al-Qaeda network" linked to Zarqawi. The Italian
investigation revealed that Zarqawi operatives in Europe were acting
at the instruction of superiors in and around Damascus and Aleppo,
including "Mullah Fuad" (described as the "gatekeeper in Syria for
volunteers intent on reaching Iraq"), "Abdullah," and "Abderrazak."

According to Jordanian intelligence, despite Zarqawi's connections to
al-Qaeda, his group has developed its own networks of operatives and
sources of funding and is not dependent on any external organization.
Couriers deliver money collected in Europe and Persian Gulf states,
while cars are bought in Jordan and sold or traded in Iraq. [5] Such
was the case with Bilal al-Hiyari, a Jordanian businessman sentenced
in October 2004 to six months in jail by Jordan's military court for
raising funds to finance Zarqawi's attacks in Iraq and Jordan.
According to the indictment, in August 2003 al-Hiyari allegedly
raised approximately $3,000 to buy a German-made Opel car that was
sent to Zarqawi in Iraq. Jordanian intelligence officials explained
that such schemes allow Zarqawi to move funds from Jordan and other
countries into Iraq, thus avoiding the risk of messengers being
caught at the border with large sums of money. [6]

Zarqawi's ambitions clearly extend beyond Iraq, and the implications
for Jordan are particularly chilling. Beyond Zarqawi's demonstrated
interest in targeting fellow Jordanians, he and his operatives have
been definitively linked to several other terrorist organizations
that have implications for Jordan's security.

In an interview with the authors, Jordanian officials recently
revealed that a number of Zarqawi operatives regularly visit Osbat al-
Ansar's "base" in Ain al-Hilweh, a Palestinian refugee camp in
southern Lebanon known as a hotbed of Islamic extremism. (For further
information on Ain al-Hilweh, see Terrorism Monitor, Issue 21, Nov.
4, 2004) The officials maintained that these Zarqawi men meet with
members of Osbat al-Ansar (designated as a terrorist organization by
the U.S. Treasury in March 2002) a small but dangerous Sunni
extremist group that Jordanian officials claim has planned attacks on
Western and Jordanian embassies in Beirut. [7]

Facing such threats, Jordan has developed a well-rounded
counterterrorism strategy combining both tactical and strategic
measures. The raids and arrests that thwarted the Jayousi plot are
but one example of the country's tactical counter-terrorism
capability. Jordan's Special Forces' counter-terrorism unit can boast
of many such successes, including the November 2002 arrest of a group
of Islamists in the southern city of Maan who had been terrorizing
the population, carrying weapons and bombs in the street, and setting
fire to homes. In September 2003, Jordanian authorities arrested the
Jordanian militant Mohammad Shalabi, also known as Abu Sayyaf, for
plotting to carry out terrorist attacks against American targets in
the country, possessing explosives, inciting riots in Maan, and
belonging to the banned militant group Takfir wal-Hijra. According to
Jordanian intelligence, Abu Sayyaf was captured in northeast Jordan
on his way to join Zarqawi in Iraq. [8]

Strategically, Jordan is one of the few countries truly engaged in
the battle of ideas. As important as it is to conduct raids, make
arrests, and freeze terror funds, the war on terror also requires
that countries deny jihadists the ability to radicalize and deploy
new recruits. In November 2004, during the holy month of Ramadan,
Chief Justice Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al Tamimi delivered a sermon during a
religious ceremony in the presence of King Abdullah II emphasizing
tolerance, humanity, the true values of Islam and rejecting
extremism. Subsequently dubbed the "Amman Message," the official
statement proclaims: "On religious grounds, on moral grounds, we
denounce the contemporary concept of terrorism which is associated
with wrongful practices wherever they come fromThese despotic
attacks on human life transgress the law of God, and we denounce
them." [9] Jordan has called for a regional Islamic conference
sometime next year to discuss and endorse the message. The Amman
Message and the conference Jordan plans to host are significant
milestones in the battle of ideas. Such efforts are critical if
jihadists like Zarqawi are to be defeated. The alternative, allowing
jihadists to dominate the battle of ideas and recruit several new
terrorists for every one killed or captured, is a recipe for failure.

Matthew Levitt, a former FBI counterterrorism analyst, is a senior
fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy. Julie Sawyer is a Research Assistant at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The two authors just
returned from a research trip to Jordan and Israel.

Notes:
1. Author interview with Jordanian scholar, November 11, 2004.
2. Author interviews with Jordanian officials, September 11, 2003 and
November 11, 2004.
3. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
4. Author interview with Jordanian official, July 7, 2004.
5. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
6. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
7. Author interview, November 11, 2004.
8. Author interview with Jordanian official, November 11, 2004.
9. "Jordan issues the `Amman Message' on Islam.'" Embassy of Jordan
Washington DC Press Release. November 9, 2004.

* * *


Ricin Fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Pankisi Gorge

By Andrew McGregor

With Russia once again threatening pre-emptive strikes on "terrorist"
installations in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, it seems timely to re-
examine the alleged activities of Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi in the region several years ago. The Pankisi Gorge is a river
valley about 34 km long in north-eastern Georgia. It is home to about
10,000 Kists, belonging to the same ethnic group as the Chechens and
Ingush. After the outbreak of the second Russo-Chechen war in 1999,
eight thousand Chechen refugees joined the Kists there. Arriving
later were Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev and the survivors
of the Battle of Komsomolskoye (site of a major Chechen defeat).
Gelayev chose to rebuild his forces in the Pankisi Gorge; with
Georgia engaged in a struggle with Russia over the breakaway
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia there was little danger of
extradition.

By 2002, unsubstantiated reports began to emerge of al-Qaeda leaders
taking refuge in the Gorge after the fall of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov even suggested Bin
Laden himself might be in the Pankisi Gorge. [1] Russia wished to
focus international attention on the Gorge, where Gelayev had built
up a significant armed force of 800 Chechens, together with about 80
international mujahideen, mostly Turks and Arabs. Georgian
authorities pretended to be ignorant of their presence, despite
having negotiated a deal to supply and arm Gelayev's force in return
for a little extra-curricular combat on behalf of Georgia in Abkhazia
in 2001.

In his pre-Iraq invasion address to the United Nations Security
Council Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that "we know that
Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia,
and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not
mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network said their goal was to
kill Russians with toxins." Powell emphasized the production of ricin
as a major threat, and the importance of Zarqawi as a master
poisoner. Abu Atiya (Adnan Muhammad Sadik) was named by Powell as the
leader of al-Qaeda's Pankisi operations and part of Zarqawi's
network. In July 2002, there were reports that the CIA had warned
Turkish officials that Abu Atiya had sent chemical or biological
materials to Turkey for use in terrorist attacks.

Georgian raids started in February 2002, while the main
security "crackdown" in Pankisi was carefully timed to follow the
September 2002 departure of Gelayev's forces from Russian territory.
At the end of the security sweep in October, fifteen minor Arab
militants were turned over to the U.S. The operation marked the first
deployment of Georgian graduates of the Train and Equip program, a
U.S. initiative to train a core professional army for Georgia. No
evidence of chemical labs was discovered, though Georgia cautiously
conceded that some militants in the Pankisi Gorge "may" have been
chemical weapons experts.


The Ricin Crisis

There seems little reason for Zarqawi to move to the Pankisi Gorge,
which makes a useful base for striking into Chechnya but is remote
from Middle Eastern operational environments. The languages in the
region are unfamiliar to most Arabs and the militants in Pankisi
under the command of Ruslan Gelayev were nearly all bound for
Chechnya. Gelayev feuded constantly with Islamist commanders in the
Chechen resistance, and would be unlikely to have taken orders from
Arab Islamists. Indeed, the entire story conflicts with the usual
account of Zarqawi being wounded in Afghanistan and receiving medical
treatment in Baghdad before joining Ansar al-Islam in the north.

In the buildup to the Iraqi war in early 2003, dozens of North
Africans (mainly Algerians) were arrested in Britain, France and
Spain on charges of preparing ricin and other chemical weapons. Colin
Powell and others trumpeted the arrests as proof of the threat posed
by the Zarqawi-Chechen-Pankisi ricin network (which had now been
expanded to include the Ansar al-Islam of Kurdish northern Iraq).

French and British security officials were astounded by Powell's
insistence on February 12, 2003, that "the ricin that is bouncing
around Europe now originated in Iraq." With the Iraq invasion only
weeks away, the source of the ricin threat moved from Georgia to
Iraq. In the UK charges were dropped when government laboratories
could find no trace of the poison in seized material. In Spain all
the suspects were released when the poisons turned out to be bleach
and detergent. In France, ricin samples were revealed to be barley
and wheat germ. [2]

Responding to the arrests in Britain and France, Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that the suspects had been trained in
Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, where al-Qaeda laboratories were
manufacturing ricin. Few bothered to question why anyone would set up
a ricin lab requiring large numbers of castor beans for the
production of even a tiny amount of purified ricin in a region with
no native castor plants.

The "Chechen Network"


French Judge Jean-Louis Brugiere (a leading anti-terrorism official)
led the attack against what came to be known as the "Chechen network"
declaring that "the Chechens are experts in chemical warfare. And
Chechnya is closer to Europe than Afghanistan." The "Chechen network"
was curiously devoid of Chechens: nearly all the suspects were
Algerian. Despite the outcome of the European cases, the myth of the
ricin-producing "Chechen network" took hold.

Chechen Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov is the only Chechen leader
who appears to have taken an interest in chemical weapons, and is
frequently accused by the FSB of planning chemical operations against
Russian troops. In 2001, leading FSB officials cited "serious grounds
for suspecting him to be a CIA agent." [3] Last October, Chechen
police discovered two kilograms of mercury, which they claimed
Chitigov intended to use to poison a water intake facility.

By August 2002 reports were emerging that Ansar al-Islam were
experimenting on animals with aerosolized ricin under Zarqawi's
direction. Aerosolization is the only method of delivering lethal
doses of ricin to large numbers of people, but requires a great deal
of specialized equipment and expertise, certainly far beyond the
limitations of a primitive lab. Ricin cannot be absorbed through the
skin and was abruptly dropped from most state weapons programs as
soon as the more lethal Sarin nerve gas was developed. Despite its
potency, no effective method has yet been devised for the mass
distribution of ricin. The weaponization of ricin is sufficiently
complex that it almost precludes such use by non-state parties.

Conclusion

There is no evidence that Zarqawi knows anything about the
manufacture or deployment of chemical and biological weapons. In the
aftermath of the Jordan bombing attempt in April, Zarqawi made his
only known statement on the use of chemical weapons, posted on
alminbar.front.ru: "If we had such a bomb and we ask God
that we have such a bomb soon we would not hesitate for a moment to
strike Israeli towns." [4]

Jordan's King Abdullah II referred to Zarqawi as a "street thug" last
July, adding that the media had inflated Zarqawi's intelligence and
skills to create a larger threat. Jordanian security services claimed
the attempted attack was a chemical assault using nerve gas and
blister agents, capable of killing 80,000 people. No evidence was
presented, and even Zarqawi refuted the use of chemical agents in the
plot. [5] Zarqawi's career has followed the path of high-school
dropout, failed video retailer, prisoner and gunman. It is thus
impossible to identify how or when Zarqawi became an expert in
chemistry.

The identification of a ricin-producing "Chechen network" under
Zarqawi's control developed because it was useful. In the media,
every unproven allegation "from un-named intelligence sources" was
treated as unquestionable evidence, each being used as proof of the
last. This house of cards was saluted by Britain, Russia, the U.S.
and eventually even the Georgians as it served to advance the
interests of each. The British government was trying to justify an
unpopular decision to join the Iraq war, and Russia was able to
implicate Georgia in a Chechen-al-Qaeda network of terror,
invoking "the common cause" of the anti-terror coalition in support
of their methods in Chechnya. The U.S. trained Georgian troops
essential for the protection of the two new oil pipelines about to
cross Georgia under the cloak of counter-terrorist assistance, while
using the Zarqawi chemical threat to drum up support in the United
Nations. [6]

Last month Russia claimed that Abu Atiya (together with Abu
Hafs "Amjet" and Abu Rabiya) commanded 200 Chechens and 30
Turkish "mercenaries" in Pankisi, though there is no explanation of
how Abu Atiya, who was arrested in Azerbaijan in September 2003, has
returned to action. [7] Georgia continues to deny the presence of any
Chechen or Arab militants in the Gorge, calling Russian statements "a
provocation." Meanwhile Abu Musab al-Zarqawi remains central to the
disinformation campaigns that obscure our understanding of Islamist
terrorism.

Dr. McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle International Security
Analysis in Toronto, Canada.

Notes:
1. "FM: Bin Laden could be in Caucasus", Associated Press, Feb. 17,
2002.
2. "The strange case of the dangerous detergent" New Statesman, April
14, 2003, By Justin Webster, "Ricin scare in Paris is false alarm,"
AP, April 11, 2003.
3. Russian Public TV (ORT), Interview with Nicolai Patrushev and
Aleksandr Zdanovich, April 18, 2001 (BBC Monitoring, April 19, 2001).
4. Translation from "`Zarqawi tape' says non-chemical attack planned
on Jordanian intelligence", AFP, April 30, 2004.
5. "Al-Zarqawi denies the Jordanian version over the chemical
attack", Arab News, May 1, 2004,
www.arabicnews.com/ansub/...0110.html.
6. Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.
7. Not to be confused with the late Abu Hafs al-Misri or Abu
Hafs `the Mauritanian'.

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MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) 2005N08/08()16:54 4064 application/x-zip-compressed z8wHnKRWIlhi. 1804 zip bv@A 83.248.91.73 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) 2005N08/08()04:32 1197 application/x-zip-compressed z8wHnKRWIlhi. 1803 zip Shobo:}bv@AbvEEE 203.140.186.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/07()18:57 664 application/x-zip-compressed z8pXGXh0OugJU 1802 zip pELN 83.248.91.13 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) 2005N08/07()09:26 1279 application/x-zip-compressed z8wHnKRWIlhi. 1801 zip looooooook 62.45.65.40 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/07()09:08 104 application/x-zip-compressed * 1800 jpg wdassadsad 212.138.64.172 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/07()03:00 6 image/pjpeg * 1799 bmp fuckerrrr 213.186.178.159 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N08/07()00:03 352 image/bmp * 1798 zip BAbv 203.140.186.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/06(y)23:01 474 application/x-zip-compressed z84tYV9Ijm8xw 1797 jpg 11111111111111 212.138.64.171 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/06(y)22:30 62 image/pjpeg * 1796 zip K 219.125.224.210 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) 2005N08/06(y)19:59 278 application/x-zip-compressed z8ENxOQE0EmxQ 1795 zip pELN^[ 83.248.90.242 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) 2005N08/06(y)16:23 4212 application/x-zip-compressed z8fCQp1Nb8/4Y 1794 zip sepanas 62.215.56.16 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; Creative) 2005N08/06(y)09:47 2081 application/x-zip-compressed z8kIf3xtuYklo 1793 zip capanas 62.215.56.16 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; Creative) 2005N08/06(y)09:22 158 application/x-zip-compressed z8kvaA8A.4VwQ 1792 zip ffff 81.10.119.87 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/06(y)07:11 103 application/x-zip-compressed z8gEFKzyUpVcs 1791 zip N\HSSpELN^[pXt@CvO 222.144.176.1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; Win 9x 4.90) 2005N08/06(y)03:44 38 application/x-zip-compressed z8d7Urh8S/H56 1790 zip usa imc111111 83.248.90.242 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) 2005N08/06(y)03:42 3132 application/x-zip-compressed z8wHnKRWIlhi. 1789 rm iirr 83.108.235.39 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N08/05()21:30 1128 audio/vnd.rn-realaudio z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1788 zip new prayer 212.138.47.13 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; (R1 1.5)) 2005N08/05()04:53 3669 application/x-zip-compressed z8zuPYt5iL1u6 1787 jpg Joyce 82.75.29.240 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; nl-NL; rv:1.7.10) Gecko/20050717 Firefox/1.0.6 2005N08/05()04:04 52 image/jpeg * 1786 xxx grr 220.105.112.16 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/05()01:43 517 video/x-ms-wmv * 1785 lzh EE@l`o@oOGA 219.102.97.62 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 9 2005N08/04()22:44 126 application/octet-stream z8kQ4T5EmH78. 1784 zip 1~5 222.3.76.53 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/04()19:33 1994 application/x-zip-compressed z8Ua522SzoQ4w 1783 gif As 84.194.183.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Sgrunt|V109|1012|S1100724997|dialno; XBE|dialno; snprtz|dialno) 2005N08/04()19:27 9 image/gif * 1782 bmp sheeeesister 213.186.170.22 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/04()17:41 30 image/pjpeg * 1781 bmp meeeeeeee3 213.186.170.22 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/04()17:32 3 image/pjpeg * 1780 zip meeeeeeeeee2 213.186.170.22 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/04()17:31 3 image/pjpeg * 1779 bmp v127B 222.3.76.53 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/04()16:20 999 image/bmp z8Ua522SzoQ4w 1778 jpg pislam 84.80.56.190 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7. Gecko/20050511 Firefox/1.0.4 2005N08/04()07:41 3 image/gif * 1777 jpg lekker 213.73.146.245 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; nl-NL; rv:1.7.10) Gecko/20050717 Firefox/1.0.6 2005N08/04()00:28 17 image/jpeg * 1776 xxx Mart Hauser 145.53.74.67 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/04()00:11 4915 video/x-ms-wmv z89iVCVjxnxn2 1775 zip up17741775}bvlB 220.109.3.10 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/03()21:13 1832 application/x-zip-compressed z8f8PfYPo6QJ6 1774 zip 5000kt@CAbv 220.109.3.10 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/03()21:10 4843 application/x-zip-compressed z8f8PfYPo6QJ6 1773 xxx Shamil Basayev 69.194.212.163 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; Media Center PC 3.0; .NET CLR 1.0.3705; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N08/03()18:21 540 video/x-ms-wmv * 1772 jpg Nederland 84.80.56.190 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7. Gecko/20050511 Firefox/1.0.4 2005N08/03()11:40 6 image/jpeg * 1771 zip qaa2 62.45.65.40 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/03()06:37 104 application/x-zip-compressed * 1770 zip qaa1 83.108.243.7 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N08/03()05:13 3442 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1769 zip momo adashi 66.98.206.74 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts) 2005N08/03()01:36 671 application/x-zip-compressed * 1768 jpg s}bv}bv 84.194.183.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Sgrunt|V109|1012|S1100724997|dialno; XBE|dialno; snprtz|dialno) 2005N08/02()23:01 30 image/pjpeg * 1767 jpg s}bv}bv 84.194.183.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Sgrunt|V109|1012|S1100724997|dialno; XBE|dialno; snprtz|dialno) 2005N08/02()23:01 30 image/pjpeg * 1766 jpg As 84.194.183.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Sgrunt|V109|1012|S1100724997|dialno; XBE|dialno; snprtz|dialno) 2005N08/02()23:00 2 image/pjpeg * 1765 jpg As 84.194.183.128 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Sgrunt|V109|1012|S1100724997|dialno; XBE|dialno; snprtz|dialno) 2005N08/02()22:58 2 image/pjpeg * 1764 zip Sae_3_4_1_T 66.98.206.74 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts) 2005N08/02()10:24 2881 application/x-zip-compressed * 1763 zip Sae_3_2_T 66.98.206.74 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts) 2005N08/02()09:48 2506 application/x-zip-compressed * 1762 zip Sae_3_3_T 66.98.206.74 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts) 2005N08/02()09:30 2238 application/x-zip-compressed * 1761 zip Sae_2T 66.98.206.74 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts) 2005N08/02()08:19 3911 application/x-zip-compressed * 1760 rar koninklijk huis belgie gesprek 62.45.65.40 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()08:12 325 application/octet-stream * 1759 exe msn account hackprog 62.45.65.40 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()08:07 106 application/octet-stream * 1758 zip hallo 62.45.65.40 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()08:05 104 application/x-zip-compressed * 1757 zip Sae_1T 66.98.206.74 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; FunWebProducts) 2005N08/02()07:28 2081 application/x-zip-compressed * 1756 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:09 51 image/pjpeg * 1755 jpg www.greenpeace.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:08 39 image/pjpeg * 1754 gif www.friesland.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:07 15 image/gif * 1753 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:05 37 image/pjpeg * 1752 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:05 6 image/pjpeg * 1751 gif www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:04 7 image/gif * 1750 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:04 58 image/pjpeg * 1749 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:03 4 image/pjpeg * 1748 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:03 16 image/pjpeg * 1747 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:03 17 image/pjpeg * 1746 gif www.stuurfout.nl 217.123.28.45 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N08/02()06:00 62 image/gif * 1745 jpg Charlotte Church 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()20:50 97 image/jpeg * 1744 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:07 124 image/jpeg * 1743 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:07 66 image/jpeg * 1742 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:07 43 image/jpeg * 1741 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:07 92 image/jpeg * 1740 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:07 88 image/jpeg * 1739 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:07 66 image/jpeg * 1738 jpg www.stuurfout.nl 82.92.152.58 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; en) Opera 8.02 2005N08/01()19:06 43 image/jpeg * 1737 bmp meeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 213.186.191.12 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N08/01()03:35 225 image/bmp * 1736 zip ho2 83.108.229.1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()21:44 3323 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1735 zip ho1 83.108.229.1 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()21:35 3323 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1734 wmf hala 212.98.136.62 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()19:40 2279 audio/x-ms-wma * 1732 jpg 1 212.138.64.172 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/31()11:44 6 image/pjpeg * 1731 zip jaish1 83.108.211.229 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()03:44 1822 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1730 zip ta2 83.108.211.229 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()00:54 600 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1729 zip ta1 83.108.211.229 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()00:52 600 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1728 zip ham2 83.108.211.229 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/31()00:00 1367 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1727 zip ham1 83.108.211.229 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/30(y)23:56 1367 application/x-zip-compressed z8DoHQLDeeIV. 1726 exe fdsf 81.10.119.87 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N07/30(y)07:20 942 application/octet-stream z8TpVY/W7Ur4M 1725 zip 12345678 212.138.64.176 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/30(y)03:12 478 application/x-zip-compressed * 1724 zip jjjjjjjjj 212.138.113.12 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/29()20:11 663 application/x-zip-compressed * 1723 rm iiiiiiiiiiii 212.138.47.17 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/29()20:06 2221 application/vnd.rn-realmedia * 1722 zip vvv 81.10.119.87 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) 2005N07/29()08:25 360 application/x-zip-compressed z8gEFKzyUpVcs 1721 htm 1111111111111111 212.138.47.14 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) 2005N07/28()22:58 681 text/html * 1720 zip 1411 82.148.97.67 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()22:50 1830 application/x-zip-compressed z8IE9480drG0Y 1719 gif 33 212.138.64.174 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:48 17 image/gif * 1718 jpg 22 212.138.64.171 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:14 79 image/pjpeg * 1717 jpg 11 212.138.64.172 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:14 6 image/pjpeg * 1716 jpg 10 212.138.64.171 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:13 88 image/pjpeg * 1715 jpg 9 212.138.64.172 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:12 28 image/pjpeg * 1714 jpg 8 212.138.64.171 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:09 21 image/pjpeg * 1713 jpg 7 212.138.64.176 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:08 13 image/pjpeg * 1712 jpg 6 212.138.64.176 Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) 2005N07/28()21:07 18 image/pjpeg *


senders IP is 213.186.191.12″, and inetnum 213.186.191.0 - 213.186.191.255″ is assigned to R3 for ADSL service of Wanadoo Jordan.

his Photo:
mkfps.hmc6.net/uploader/s...up1737.bmp

Terrorist Group         Website         Last Confirmed Date
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade         www.kataebaqsa1.com/         September 8, 2004
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)         www.palestine-info.info         September 8, 2004
Hizballah (Party of God)         www.nasrollah.org/         September 8, 2004
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)         www.qudsway.com         September 8, 2004
Hamas military wing, Izza Deen al-Qassam         www.alqassam.info         October 16, 2004